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Abstract. We formally study iterated block ciphers that alternate be-
tween two sequences of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
rounds. It is demonstrated that, in some cases the effect of alternat-
ing increases security, while in other cases the effect may strictly de-
crease security relative to the corresponding product of one of its compo-
nent sequences. As this would appear to contradict conventional wisdom
based on the ideal cipher approximation, we introduce new machinery
for provable security comparisons. The comparisons made here simulta-
neously establish a coherent ordering of security metrics ranging from
key-recovery cost to computational indistinguishability.
Keywords. block ciphers, product ciphers, multiple encryption, ma-
jorization.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview.
For many decades, various issues related to product ciphers have been raised
and addressed. A large part of Shannon’s seminal work [16] is devoted to both
theoretical and practical aspects of products, and his invocation of the pastry
dough mixing analogy [16, p. 712] captures a very intuitive idea that by alternat-
ing between two weakly mixing operations, we should eventually achieve strong
mixing. Even today, many modern block cipher designs retain an element of this
structure (see, e.g. [8]).
To model such mixing, we formalize the notion of an alternating product ci-
pher as an interleaving product of independent ciphers as depicted in Fig. 3.
We then ask: How well does the mixing work, and how might it fail? Various
outcomes seem possible. We present a threefold alternating product with good
security expansion. However, a related construction demonstrates somewhat sur-
prisingly, an alternating product which is strictly less secure than the two-term
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product of one of the component sequences by itself. On its face, this would ap-
pear to contradict an emerging conventional wisdom about multiple encryption
based on the ideal cipher approximation, “that double encryption improves the
security only marginally [...] triple encryption is significantly more secure than
single and double encryption” [6]. The situation demands that we explore the
problem of provable security comparisons. We find that certain security order-
ings transcend the (somewhat artificial) boundary between classical and modern
cryptography.
We conclude that alternating product ciphers are, at a fundamental level,
different from two-term products. Ascertaining their security is more nuanced
and they provide evidence of further limits on the applicability of the ideal cipher
approximation (see also [1]).
1.2 Motivation.
We are initially motivated by how we might generalize the question, “is a cipher
a group?”, in the case of alternating products. Roughly, an encryption function
E : K ×M → M is said to have the group property [16, p.673], if for each key
pair (k1, k2), there is another key k ∈ K such that E(k2, E(k1, p)) = E(k, p)
for each plaintext p ∈ M . Equivalently, the product of the cipher with itself
produces no new permutations.
The group property obviously affords the cryptanalyst considerable advan-
tage, if only because it reduces the cost of brute-force search against the product.
Understandably, the question was raised as a possible weakness to multiple en-
cryption schemes of DES [7]. These concerns were dismissed with increasing
strength as researchers showed that DES was not likely to be a group [7], that
it is not a group [3] and that it generates a large group [18].
Questions about whether a cipher is a group or whether multiple encryption
improves security are really questions about ordering. That is to say, rather than
quantifying specific models of attack against fixed encryption systems, we seek
to establish the correct ordering between constructs of interest. In the case of
alternating products, we find the comparison between XY Z and XZ to be the
most intriguing since our intuition suggests that inserting statistically indepen-
dent Y in between X and Z should improve security. Thus in comparing the two
products of Fig. 1, we find that the order itself depends on the internal structure
of the constituents.
Z Y X vs Z X
Fig. 1. Motivating comparison between alternating product XY Z and XZ.
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1.3 Toward Coherent Security Ordering.
Motivated by the above, we start by quantifying how the permutation count of
an alternating product can grow or shrink. Numerically comparing these counts
offers one possible ordering, since integers are totally ordered (every pair is com-
parable). But we argue that by relaxing this notion and considering partial/pre
orders on ciphers, we pave the way to stronger and more broadly applicable
security comparisons. There is a lucrative trade-off here: if we give up compar-
ing every pair of ciphers, we are left with a more meaningful ordering of the
remainder.
One powerful order (known to not be total) ismajorization, and a great many
interesting real-valued security metrics are known to respect majorization. These
are called Schur-convex (concave if they reverse it). This covers the case of zero
data complexity in the far left of Fig. 2; if a majorization relationship between
two ciphers can be established, then the ciphers are also ordered by the real
values of any Schur-convex(concave) function.
Better still, the comparisons of Fig. 1 in this paper possess additional struc-
ture, facilitating a coherent ordering of security metrics in arbitrary data com-
plexity q. Specifically, we show in Sect. 3, that nonadaptive chosen-plaintext
attack (ncpa) advantage [11,17] as well as conditional guesswork [13] are such
metrics. This is depicted in the two rightmost diagrams in Fig. 2.
z .......................

y
H(Z)
❄
.............
≥
H(Y )
❄
z ........................
q
y
AdvZ(q)
❄
.......
≤
AdvY (q)
❄
z ...........................
q
y
W (Z|C, p)
❄
.......
≥
W (Y |C, p)
❄
Fig. 2. We establish a coherent ordering of the ciphers in Fig. 1 by showing the con-
sistency of a broad range of security metrics, crossing the divide between information-
theoretic and modern cryptography.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Prerequisites.
We’ve tried to make this paper readable by nonspecialists conversant in contem-
porary cryptography. But in order to follow the proofs, we assume additional
familiarity with the basics of permutation groups, probability theory and repre-
sentation theory, referring the reader to [15], [5]. We also exploit aspects of the
theory of majorization, treated very well in [9]. Since that is critical here, we
provide a brief summary in §3.1.
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2.2 Shannon’s Model.
We formalize Shannon’s model [16] by representing an encryption system as a
permutation-valued random variable. Precisely, given message spaceM, let G be
some subgroup of the full symmetric group SM of all permutations on M. An
encryption system on M, or G-cipher for short, is a G-valued random variable
X . As a notational convention, for a G-cipher X (always uppercase), we shall
denote the probability distribution from which it is drawn by lowercase function
x : G→ R and write X ∼ x.
Shannon observed that the set of encryption systems is endowed with the
structure of an unital associative algebra1 whose sum and product correspond
to parallel and series composition, respectively. The composition in series of
independent G-ciphers X,Y gives the notion of a product cipher Z = XY , which
survives to this day. It is a standard observation that the probability distribution
of the product z(g) = Pr [XY = g], is given by the convolution z = x ∗ y:
z(g) =
∑
h∈G
x(gh−1)y(h). (1)
3 Models For Security Comparison
After a brief review of the theory of majorization, we explore ways in which
claims of security ordering may be rigorously established as in Fig. 2.
3.1 Majorization and Schur-Convexity.
Given vectors x, y ∈ Rn+ we say x is majorized by y and write x  y, if their l1
norms agree and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
k∑
i=1
x[i] ≤
k∑
i=1
y[i],
with the values rearranged by x[1] ≥ x[2] ≥ · · · ≥ x[n] and similarly for y. The
vector x↓ is the decreasing rearrangement of x (so x[i] = (x↓)i). Majorization is
a preorder relation, so not all vectors are comparable in this way. We have, from
the Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya theorem, that x  y is equivalent to the existence of
a doubly-stochastic matrix D such that x = Dy. Furthermore, by the Birkhoff-
von Neumann theorem, such a matrix is a convex sum of permutations, so x  y
means:
x =
∑
π∈Sn
pπpi · y. (2)
For our purposes, the vectors will usually be probability distributions, each with
l1 norm of 1. It is readily verified that the uniform distribution u = (1/n, . . . , 1/n)
1 These days, it would be identified as the group algebra RG.
4
has u  x for all probability vectors x. If x  y and y  x, then x is a permutation
of y. If x  y but x is not a permutation of y, we’ll write x ≺ y.
Certain useful real-valued functions respect or reverse majorization. So if φ :
R
n
+ → R has φ(x) ≤ φ(y) (φ(x) ≥ φ(y)) whenever x  y, we call φ Schur-convex
(concave). If a Schur-convex (concave) function additionally satisfies φ(x) < φ(y)
(φ(x) > φ(y)) when x ≺ y, we call φ strictly Schur-convex (concave).
Examples and applications abound throughout science and engineering (see
e.g. [4] for an interesting information-theoretic treatment). In particular, Shan-
non entropy, Re´nyi entropy and guesswork [10] are strictly Schur-concave. Fur-
thermore marginal guesswork [12] and Bonneau’s α-guesswork [2] are Schur-
concave. For further details, see [9, pp. 562–564] and [14, Appx.]. As remarked,
majorization treats the case of zero data complexity, which is sometimes useful
by itself.
3.2 Nontrivial Data Complexity.
For an adversary with access to q plaintext-ciphertext pairs or equivalently q
queries to a chosen-plaintext oracle, we can often identify a vector mapping
σ : V → Vˆ and a Schur-convex function φq on Vˆ measuring in some way the
cipher’s resistance to attack. If z  y in V has additional structure so that zˆ  yˆ
in Vˆ , we write z  φq◦σ y or just z q y when clear from context. This situation
affords meaningful security comparisons for arbitrary data complexity. A proof
of the following is sketched in the appendix and proved in the full version [14].
Theorem 1 Given data complexity limit q and G-ciphers X ∼ x, Y ∼ y and
Z ∼ z with Z = XY , we have (for appropriate choices of σ)
1. z q y for conditional guesswork: W (E|C, p), p ∈ M
(q) is Schur-concave as
a function of eˆ,
2. z q y for distinguishing advantage: Adv
ncpa
E (q) is Schur-convex as a func-
tion of eˆ,
Here E ∼ e is a generic argument.
The relationship z q y can arise in many ways, but for our purposes, we’ll use
the fact that Z = XY .
4 Alternating Product Ciphers
4.1 The Formal Definition.
We may now give a formal definition of an alternating product followed by an
example.
Definition 1 An alternating product is the product of independent G-ciphers
alternating between two sequences of i.i.d. G-ciphers.
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Example 1 Let {Xi}
r+1
i=1 be i.i.d. G-ciphers and let {Yi}
r
i=1 be distinct i.i.d.
G-ciphers. Then E = Xr+1YrXr · · ·Y1X1 is an alternating product of Xi and
Yi. Notice that Def. 1 permits either an even or an odd number of components
in the product. We can imagine E as alternating between the “factors” of two
products X = Xr+1 · · ·X1 and Y = Yr · · ·Y1 as depicted in Fig. 3 below.
X =
E =
Y =
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Xr+1
↓
Xr+1
X1
↓
X1 Y1
↑
Y1
X2
↓
X2 Y2
↑
Y2
Fig. 3. An alternating product cipher seen as an interleaving of the terms of two
iterated ciphers.
4.2 Threefold Mixing Convolutions and Double Cosets.
While most of this paper is devoted to alternating products, we treat a slightly
more general case in this section to explicate a key observation, namely how
mixing in typical iterated block ciphers is related to expansion along double
cosets when randomness enters via a subgroup operation (like the XOR-ing of
round subkeys).
Consider a threefold product T = XY Z with Z confined to subgroupK ≤ G,
X confined to subgroup H ≤ G, and Y deterministically taking single value pi ∈
G. To understand how the convolution t = x ∗ y ∗ z decomposes, it’s instructive
to employ an action of g ∈ G on functions φ : G → R taking φ 7→ φ ◦ g−1,
in other words (g · φ)(f) = φ(g−1f). With this in mind, we have the following
useful lemma.
Lemma 1 If the support of φ is confined to a left coset kH, then the support of
g · φ is confined to gkH.
Proof: Assume supp(φ) ⊆ kH , and observe that f ∈ supp(g ·φ) =⇒ (g ·φ)(f) 6=
0 =⇒ φ(g−1f) 6= 0 =⇒ g−1f ∈ supp(φ) =⇒ g−1f ∈ kH =⇒ f ∈ gkH .
Thus supp(g · φ) ⊆ gkH . 
It should be intuitively clear that T is spread out over the double cosetHpiK,
but the following stronger result details some of the mechanics of the mixing,
facilitating deeper security comparisons.
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Theorem 2 The cipher T has supp(t) ⊆ HpiK and its distribution is a convex
direct sum
t =
m⊕
i=1
αizi,
of m = [H:H∩πK] distinct probability vectors. Furthermore, each zi is majorized
by z.
Proof: The three terms in T = XY Z are given by probability distributions
x(g), y(g) and z(g) with supp(x) ⊆ H , supp(y) = {pi} and supp(z) ⊆ K. First
note that by the associativity of product ciphers, we may write T = X(Y Z),
and the inner convolution z′ = y ∗ z yields,
z′(g) =
∑
h∈G
y(h)z(h−1g) = z(pi−1g) = pi · z(g),
which by Lem. 1, precisely describes a function confined to piK.
Now the outer convolution t = x ∗ z′ yields
t(g) =
∑
h∈G
x(h)z′(h−1g) =
∑
h∈H
x(h)z′(h−1g) =
∑
h∈H
x(h)h · z′(g).
Recognizing that z′ is confined to piK, it is natural according to Lem. 1 to
collect terms for which h · z′ is confined to the same left coset of K. Indeed,
recall that the left action of H on left cosets G/K (the supports of the various
h · z′) is equivalent to the double coset action H\G/K. We may decompose the
orbit HpiK =
⋃m
i=1 λiK, where the orbit size m = [H :H ∩
πK] is given by the
orbit-stabilizer theorem with
S , StabH\(G/K)(piK) = H ∩
πK.
Furthermore, we recognize {h ∈ H | h(piK) = λiK} = hiS, for some left transver-
sal {hi} of S in H . This gives us a recipe for collecting terms,
t =
∑
h∈H
x(h)h · z′ =
m∑
i=1
∑
h∈hiS
x(h)h · z′ =
m∑
i=1
x(hiS)
(
1
x(hiS)
∑
h∈hiS
x(h)h · z′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
, zi
=
m∑
i=1
x(hiS)zi,
where, by construction, each zi is confined to left coset λiK, so the sum is a direct
sum. By the Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya and Birkhoff-von Neumann theorems,
zi =
1
x(hiS)
∑
h∈hiS
x(h)h · z′
is a convex sum of permuted copies of z′, assuring majorization zi  z
′  z.
Finally, taking αi = x(hiS) yields
∑
i αi = 1 and the theorem is proved. 
Uniform distributions simplify the matter.
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Corollary 1 When both X and Z are uniformly distributed, T is uniformly
distributed on HpiK.
Proof: The uniformity of Z implies z  zi  z, so each zi is uniform on λiK.
The uniformity of X implies
t =
m∑
i=1
x(hiS)zi =
|S|
|H |
m∑
i=1
zi =
|H ∩ πK|
|H |
m∑
i=1
zi =
1
m
m∑
i=1
zi,
which precisely describes a function uniform on HpiK. 
The following is immediate.
Corollary 2 If in addition to the conditions of the previous corollary, |HpiK| >
|K| then t ≺ z.
Remark. For noncommutative G, the additional condition in Coro. 2 is actually
the typical case, even when H = K. For the remainder of this paper we assume
H 6= πH so that [H :H ∩ πH ] > 1 and thus |HpiH | > |H |. This is always true in
a simple group since H = πH means H is normal. 
5 Applications
5.1 An Expanding Alternating Product.
If, in Coro. 2, we further imposeH = K, we obtain an alternating product cipher
in the sense of Def. 1.
Proposition 1 The alternating product cipher T = XY Z is more secure than
D = XZ when X and Z are uniform H-ciphers and Y is deterministic on {pi},
in the sense that:
a). The mixing of permutations in T produces dramatically more than D.
b). t ≺ d, so by any strictly Schur-convave security metric, T is more secure
than D.
c). t q d, so by the security metrics of Thm. 1, T is no less secure than D.
Proof: For (a) and (b), we need only apply Coro. 1 and Coro. 2. For (c), observe
that since D = XZ = Z, T = XY Z = (XY )D, we have the necessary product
relation for Thm. 1. 
5.2 A Collapsing Alternating Product.
Now let H be a subgroup of G and let pi ∈ G fall strictly outside H (so H 6= piH).
Consider three independent G-ciphers X,Y, Z, where both X and Z are uni-
formly distributed on the left coset piH and Y takes the value pi−1 determin-
istically. We seek to compare the products T = XYZ vs D = XZ. Note that
since X and Z are i.i.d., and Y is independent of these, T is also an alternating
product. We have the following.
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Proposition 2 The product cipher D is more secure than the alternating prod-
uct T in that:
a). The mixing of permutations in D produces dramatically more than T .
b). d ≺ t, so by any strictly Schur-convex security metric, D is more secure than
T .
c). d q t, so by the security metrics of Thm. 1, D is no less secure than T .
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may drop the trailing pi, which poses no
cryptanalytic barrier. We compare instead the products T ′ = X ′Y Z and D′ =
X ′Z, withX ′ uniform onH . Writing T ′ = X ′(Y Z) the inner convolution v = y∗z
trivially reduces to uniform onH . In this way, T ′ = X ′V is the double encryption
of Prop. 1. On the other hand, D′ is uniform on HpiH since it is of the form
of the triple product of Prop. 1. The desired result follows at once from this
reversal of roles of the double and triple product from Prop. 1. 
5.3 A Collapsing General Alternating Product.
Consider again the general alternating product cipher of Fig. 3 and Ex. 1, only
now with each Xi uniform on piH and each Yi deterministically taking pi
−1. We
seek to compare E = Xr+1YrXr · · ·Y1X1 with X = Xr+1 · · ·X1. Again because
products are associative, we may write E = Xr+1((YrXr) · · · (Y1X1)), and each
of the inner convolutions ei = yi ∗xi trivially collapses to uniform on H . Further
the sequence of convolutions v = er ∗ · · ·∗ e1 remains uniform on H and the final
xr+1 ∗ v is uniform on piH . On the other hand x2 ∗ x1 has support on translate
of double coset HpiH and continued left convolution can only make this count
go up. Clearly then, we have.
Proposition 3 X is more secure than E.
5.4 A Resource-Bounded Example of Extreme Expansion.
It may seem from our treatment in the above examples that the ciphers here
are purely information theoretic, applying only to infeasible and hypothetical
ciphers. In this section, we present a positive example of a computationally effi-
cient alternating product cipher T = XY Z which has nearly optimal expansion
of permutations along a huge double coset, yet where the D = XY is trivially
distinguishable from any idealized cipher.
To facilitate such a comparison, we exploit special properties of a polynomial-
time cipher which achieves every permutation (given enough key construction
data or equivalently a private random function oracle).
This construction from [13] called a universal security amplifier was originally
put forth to decided whether any efficient block cipher possessed a property of
the one-time pad, namely that when composed with a non-perfect cipher was
strictly more secure.
For security parameter n, letM′ = {0, . . . , 2n} and let X and Z independent
universal security amplifiers onM = {0, . . . , 2n−1}, so they leave fixed the final
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plaintext 2n. Let Y deterministically pick out any permutation pi 6∈ SM. For
example pi could simply add 1 mod 2n + 1, which is clearly computationally
feasible. Now we’d like to compare T = XY Z with D = XZ. Since X and
Z clearly have the group property, supp(d) = SM, and so encrypting once the
plaintext 2n will yield ciphertext 2n with 100% probability. The following is thus
immediate.
Proposition 4 The product D is distinguishable from any idealized cipher.
We may further exploit Thm. 2 and in this case, the expansion is huge.
Proposition 5 The alternating product cipher T has supp(t) on about (2n+1)!
permutations.
Proof: Because the action SM′ on M
′ is multiply transitive we have by a stan-
dard result from group theory (see [15, Thm. 9.6]) that SM′ = SM∪SMpiSM,
in other words the double coset relevant to Thm. 2, SMpiSM is nearly the whole
of SM′ . This double coset has size (2
n + 1)!− 2n! ≈ (2n + 1)!.
It remains then to show t has full support on the double coset. But z has
full support on SM [13], and by Thm. 2 each zi  z so it cannot have fewer
permutations on each of the left cosets λiSM. This forces supp(t) = SMpiSM,
and we are done. 
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Appendices
A.1 Variation Distance to Uniformity.
The following lemma will prove quite useful.
Lemma 2 The variation distance to uniformity is Schur-convex.
Proof: Suppose x  y with x, y ∈ Rn+. As a consequence of the definition,
‖u− x‖ =
kx∑
i=1
x[i] −
kx
n
, and ‖u− y‖ =
ky∑
i=1
y[i] −
ky
n
,
where kx = max
{
i | x[i] ≥ 1/n
}
and ky = max
{
i | y[i] ≥ 1/n
}
. If kx < ky, then
ky∑
i=1
y[i] −
ky
n
=
kx∑
i=1
y[i] +
ky∑
i=kx+1
y[i] −
(
kx
n
+
ky − kx
n
)
=
kx∑
i=1
y[i] −
kx
n
+
ky∑
i=kx+1
(
y[i] −
1
n
)
≥
kx∑
i=1
x[i] −
kx
n
.
I.e., ‖u− y‖ ≥ ‖u− x‖. In case kx ≥ ky the result follows mutatis mutandis. 
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A.2 Sketch of Proof of Thm. 1.
Proof Sketch of Thm. 1: For arbitrary q-tuple p ∈ M(q), let H = StabG(p), and
let {gi} be a left transversal for H in G. Then the two cases correspond to two
different induced representations from H to G. Specifically, R↑GH describes distri-
butions over q-tuples for comparing values ofAdvncpaX (q), while RH↑
G
H describes
the distributions over all permutations for comparing values of W (X |C, p).
In either case, a general result adapted from [13, Lem. 3.3] is that if z  y
in V ↑GH
∼=
⊕
i gi ⊗ V and the permutations for this majorization in (2) act on it
by permuting direct summands gi ⊗ V then
z
(i)
↓ =
[G:H]∑
i=1
ωijDijy
(i)
↓ , (3)
where z(i) and y(i) are projections of z and y into the direct summands of z and
y, and where each Dij is doubly stochastic as is the matrix Ω = [ωij ].
(Case 1:) Define σ taking x 7→ xˆ =
∑
i x
(i)
↓ . The product relation assures
(3), which by a result of Day [9, Prop. 5.A.6] implies zˆ  yˆ. Since guesswork is
Schur-concave and W (X |C, p) =W (
∑
i x
(i)
↓ ) we have z q y.
(Case 2:) Define σ taking x 7→ xˆ = [x(g1H), . . . , x(g[G:H]H)]
t. Likely begin-
ning with [17] and more recently [11] NCPA advantage AdvncpaX (q) is identified
with variation distance to uniformity ‖xˆ− uˆ‖, which by Lem. 2 is Schur-convex.
Now the action of G on G/H also gives rise to a left module action of RG on
R↑GH consistent with (3), now with 1-dimensional summands. The 1× 1 doubly
stochastic matrices vanish and we obtain zˆ = Ωyˆ or zˆ  yˆ. Again z q y by the
Schur-convexity of AdvncpaX (q). 
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